By Leen Spruit
In 1503, Nifo released De intellectu, the key paintings of his early occupation, relating questions of philosophical psychology. according to an in depth evaluation of the perspectives of his predecessors, Nifo during this paintings awarded an research of the most problems with Peripatetic noetics, particularly beginning and immortality of the mind or rational soul, its relation to the physique, its solidarity and elements, the speculative mind, and highbrow beatitude. the following the 1554 version is reproduced. The creation is by way of an in depth analytical precis of the contents of the paintings. The Appendix encompasses a chronology of Nifos existence and works, and a whole index of the chapters of De intellectu.
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Extra info for Agostino Nifo De intellectu
R: “Quod rationalis anima simul cum corpore ac in corpore oriatur, ut dixi, non expectes a me demonstrationes, nec decebat hoc esse demonstrabile, quod enim meritum ac nostrae fidei praemium adepti fuissimus. Propter quod tanquam arcanum sibi Deus retinuit nec hoc revelare iussit nisi credentibus. Verum licet indemonstrabile hoc sit, persuaderi id potest forte melioribus syllogismis quam his, quibus philosophi utuntur ad oppositum huius. Persuademus ergo primo hoc modo. ” 148 Nifo , fol. v: “Verum fideli sat est id credere, inquantum ex divinis sapientibus reperitur approbatum.
172 Vicomercato , pp. , , and –. 173 Collegium Conimbricense , p. , where Goes cited Nifo, De intellectu, IV, ch. . 175 Against Nifo he furthermore argues that the cognitive power cannot be purely receptive, because then human knowledge would depend “ab extrinseco”. 178 John Ponce (ca. 181 . Note on the Text Here the text of the edition of Nifo’s work is reproduced. Folios are distinguished by a single vertical line (‘|’), and columns by a double vertical line (‘||’).
Consensus among commentators over ‘common’ definition, but not over ‘proper’ definition; according to Alexander, a proper definition regards species of souls (or their activity); accordingly, the Latins develop (distinct) definitions for vegetative, sensible and rational souls; the Greeks argue that the definition of rational soul ‘contains’ (“complicat”) those of the other souls; considering three souls, five potencies (related to five activities), and four levels, Thomas argues that the proper definition of rational soul contains other capabilities potentially; several issues can be individuated: () the (im)mortality of rational soul, () its plurality or uniqueness, () its relation with the body, () its parts, () their definition, () the three intellectual acts, and () the state of soul after death; these issues are qualified as honorable, admirable, noble, and divine.