By Daniel W. Drezner
Has globalization diluted the ability of nationwide governments to manage their very own economies? Are overseas governmental and nongovernmental firms weakening the carry of geographical regions on international regulatory agendas? Many observers imagine so. yet in All Politics Is Global, Daniel Drezner argues that this view is incorrect. regardless of globalization, states--especially the good powers--still dominate foreign regulatory regimes, and the regulatory pursuits of states are pushed by means of their household interests.
As Drezner indicates, nation measurement nonetheless concerns. the nice powers--the usa and the ecu Union--remain the main gamers in writing worldwide laws, and their energy is because of the dimensions in their inner fiscal markets. in the event that they agree, there'll be potent international governance. in the event that they do not agree, governance could be fragmented or useless. And, mockingly, the main robust resources of great-power personal tastes are the least globalized parts in their economies.
Testing this revisionist version of worldwide regulatory governance on an surprisingly wide array of situations, together with the net, finance, genetically transformed organisms, and highbrow estate rights, Drezner exhibits why there's such disparity within the power of foreign regulations.
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Additional info for All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes
Statistical analysis is of little use in testing this model against competing explanations. Operationalizing a common measure of the dependent variable—effective regulatory coordination—across issue areas is extremely problematic. Examining formal international agreements is one way to measure policy coordination, but there is no observable and veriﬁable method for mea112 Murphy, The Structure of Regulatory Competition. 26 • Chapter One suring effective implementation that travels across disparate issue areas.
Richard Baldwin et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Drusilla K. Brown, “International Trade and Core Labor Standards,” Discussion Paper 2000–2005, Department of Economics, Tufts University, Medford, MA, January 2000; Robert J. Flanagan, “Labor Standards and International Competitive Advantage,” paper presented at the International Labor Standards Conference, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, May 2002; Hye Jee Cho, “Political Risk, Labor Standards and Foreign Direct Investment,” paper presented at UCLA’s CIBER Doctoral Reseach Seminar, Ventura, CA, June 2002.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Drusilla K. Brown, “International Trade and Core Labor Standards,” Discussion Paper 2000–2005, Department of Economics, Tufts University, Medford, MA, January 2000; Robert J. Flanagan, “Labor Standards and International Competitive Advantage,” paper presented at the International Labor Standards Conference, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, May 2002; Hye Jee Cho, “Political Risk, Labor Standards and Foreign Direct Investment,” paper presented at UCLA’s CIBER Doctoral Reseach Seminar, Ventura, CA, June 2002.